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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No* 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 14650 
-vs- : 
KENNETH L. ANDERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which Kenneth 
L. Anderson was charged with the Crime of Automobile 
Homicide in violation of Section 76-5-207 of the Utah 
Statutes Annotated (as amended 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried without a jury before the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, District Judge, on May 12, 
1976 and was found guilty as charged. Appellant was 
sentenced to serve the indeterminate term of 0-5 years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have appellant's conviction 
affirmed* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 29, 1976, at about 3:00 a.m., appellant 
was driving a Chevrolet pickup truck north on State Road 
214 in Utah County (T-9). At the same time a Toyota 
pick-up truck was driving south on the same highway. 
Appellant's vehicle, traveling approximately 55-60 miles 
per hour (T-34,48) crossed over a safety island and into 
the approaching Toyota's lane. Appellant then swerved 
back towards his own lane and struck the Toyota head-on 
in the center of the highway (T-27,2S and State's Exhibit 
#11). Mrs* Sherry Lynn Forsythe was killed instantly 
as a result of the collision. While the Toyota applied 
its brakes and skidded, there is no evidence that appellant 
applied his brakes prior to the collision (T-28) . 
At trial appellant stipulated that his blood was 
found to contain 0.22 per cent alcohol (T-4) shortly 
after the accident* 
A highway patrol officer asked appellant if he was 
the driver of the Chevrolet and he answered affirmatively 
(T-13). The officer also testified that another individual 
was on the passenger side of the Chevrolet, that that 
individual was bleeding and that there was a great deal 
of blood on the passenger side (T-44). Appellant had only 
minor cuts (T-4 6) . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE 
TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION, 
Appellant was charged with the crime of Automobile 
Homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (as 
amended 1974): 
"Criminal homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. . . to a degree which renders 
the actor incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle, causes the death of 
another by operating a motor vehicle in 
a negligent manner." 
On appeal appellant contends that two elements of the 
above statute were not supported with sufficient evidence 
to justify a conviction. He claims that there is in-
sufficient evidence that he was "operating a motor vehicle" 
and that he did not "operate a motor vehicle in a 
negligent manner". Further, appellant contends that the 
word "negligent" in the above statute requires a showing 
of criminal negligence. Respondent submits that there 
is sufficient evidence to convict appellant and that the 
statute requires only a showing of simple negligence to 
justify a conviction. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (as amended 1974) 
requires only a showing of simple negligence. 
-3-
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Were it not for appellant's appeal, respondent 
would have considered it obviously clear and long settled 
in the State of Utah that a showing of simple negligence -
will satisfy the requirements of the Automobile Homicide 
Statute. A short examination of judicial decisions and 
rules of statutory construction will suffice to demonstrate 
the fact. 
In 1957 the Utah Legislature passed an Automobile 
Homicide Statute that was almost identical to the present 
statute. (Laws of Utah 1957, Chap. 165). However, 
in place of the present language ". . . operating a motor 
vehicle in a negligent manner", the 1957 law read "operating 
or driving any automobile. • . in a reckless, negligent or 
careless manner, or with wanton or reckless disregard 
of human life or safety. . . . " The meaning of this earlier 
language was construed by the Utah Supreme Court, four 
years later, in Utah v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 
P.2d 1019 (1961). The Court said that the latter phrase 
("with wanton or reckless disregard of human life") is 
the generally accepted meaning of criminal negligence but 
that the former phrase ("in a reckless, negligent or care-
less manner") is considered to mean only ordinary or simple 
negligence (364 P.2d at 1019). Thus, the Court held 
the statute was satisfied by a showing of either criminal 
-4-
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or simple negligence* This holJirij wr.i-; affirmed as 
recently as 197 4 in State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah 
197^j. 
3: •• ) , ine Utah Legislature amended the 
Automobile Homicide Statute by deleting the phrase 
"or xvith wanton or reckless disregard of human life." 
(Laws of Utah, 1973, Chap. 196). In other words, after 
1973 the statute read " operating a motor vehicle in 
a rec\<-!; ;. negligent oi careless manner," and thus required 
only a showing of what tl i;> Utah Supreme Court had previously 
termed "simple negligence." 
!•-.• ; egislature is presumed to be aware of 
judicial construction of its statutory terms. Therefore, 
a very w e n -••-..• ub"» of si-j t uhoivy construction requires 
that when a legislature uses a term, in an enactment which 
has previously been construed judic; i u x^ji&ia -;rp 
nro3u. . intended the term u retain the meaning 
given by '• /uit previous judicial constructior -^.i.-rh 
i. ale in u''; • H , Greenhalgh . * ,;,ayson City, ^ - . .•„ ,•' -
(Utah L5:' -s w^l 1 as most jurisdictions. * see 
State v. Govorko, 23 Ar.iz. An*-. 3Pn, s33 P. 2d 6?.?> '•- -
a n d
 £^il,.y.- Chapman, 8 5 Wash . .••,--•••; P.°d 8J3 * i^ /5) ) . 
Therefore,, we must find that the Utah Legislature intended 
that a showing of simple ru-o"! V-IC-P ' J • .-*:..-:..• o convict 
vi.^^r : J, -i;o;:-\. 'ovicide Statute. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In 1974 the statute was again amended when 
the legislature substituted "in a negligent manner11 
for "in a reckless, negligent or careless manner." 
(See Compiler's Notes, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 
(1975 Pocket Supp.). Thus we must presume that the 
legislature meant to affirm again their concurrance in the 
judicial interpretation of the statutory language. As 
the Court said in State v. Johnson, supra; 
" . . . the legislation must be 
read in the light of its clear 
language and import. . . . " 
364 P.2d at 1019. 
Therefore: 
11
. . . a death caused by simple .-
negligence committed by a driver 
while under the influence of liquor, 
is an offense within the contemplation 
of the statute." 364 P.2d at 1020. 
As additional support for respondent's position, 
it should be pointed out that the Utah Automobile Homicide 
Statute was lifted almost bodily and verbatim from the 
Colorado Statutes. (State v. Johnson, supra, 364 P.2d 
at 1020). Appellant would argue the criminal negligence 
section, but that always existed and did not change 
anyway. After the Colorado legislature passed the statute, 
but before Utah adopted it, the Colorado Supreme Court 
twice interpreted it as above, that is, only requiring 
simple negligence. (See Kinehart v. People, 105 Colo. 
123, 95 P.2d 10 (1939), and Kallnback v. People, 125 
Colo. 144, 242 P.2d 222 (1952)). As the Utah Supreme Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It is almost axiomatic that 
the judicial interpretation of legis-
lation by the courts of a state from 
which a statute is borrowed, merits 
considerable dignity and weight in our 
own judicial construction of the 
borrowed enactment, and that our courts 
ordinarily will consider that our 
legislature passed the law with the 
judicial interpretation given it by 
the highest court of the sister state, 
as a traveling companion attending 
the local legislation." 364 P.2d 
at 1020. 
Therefore, since the Colorado courts construe the 
statute as requiring only simple negligence, and since 
the Utah Legislature adopted the Colorado statute, the Utah 
Courts should presume that the Utah Legislature intended 
the Colorado interpretation (State v. Johnson, supra, 
364 P.2d at 1020). 
In summation then, respondent submits that the 
standard which would suffice to sustain a conviction of 
Automobile Homicide is simple and not criminal negligence. 
The Utah and Colorado Courts have so construed the 
statute and we must presume that the legislature in-
tended such a construction. 
B• Appellant's conviction should be affirmed 
even if the standard is criminal negligence. 
Respondent submits that the Utah Automobile Homicide 
Statute requires no more than simple negligence, however, 
even if the standard were higher, appellant's conviction 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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should still be affirmed since his actions were so grossly 
negligent as to constitute wanton, reckless, or marked 
disregard of human life or safety, which in Utah is the 
definition of criminal negligence. (See State v. Clark, 
223 P.2d 184 (Utah 1950, and numerous-cases cited therein). 
Two items of evidence are very clear. First, 
appellant stipulated that his blood contained .22% 
alcohol (T-4,5). This is over twice the level of pre-
sumptive intoxication and indicates that appellant was 
grossly drunk at the time of the accident. A highway 
patrol officer testified that it was "very obvious" 
appellant was intoxicated (T-15), because he smelled 
strongly of alcohol, and he couldn't hardly walk or stand 
(T~36). Second, for the last few seconds prior to the 
collision appellant was in the wrong, or on-coming lane 
of traffic. A highway patrol officer testified that 
appellant left his lane at a point 360 feet from the 
point of collision. Appellant then cut back toward his 
own land and collided with the victim's automobile in the 
safety island (T-27, 28 and State1 s Exhibit #11). The 
officer further testifedd that appellant was going 
somewhere between 55 and 60 miles per hour (T~48) and that 
there were no skidmarks or any other evidence of appellant 
having applied his brakes prior to the collision (T-28). 
-8-
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The law in Utah is very clear that both the 
act of driving under the influence of alcohol and that of 
driving on the wrong side of the road constitute 
criminal negligence. Therefore, even if the Automobile 
Homicide Statute does require criminal negligence 
(Respondent still contends it does not) there is still 
more than sufficient evidence to convict appellant* 
This Court said in State v. Capps, 176 P.2d 
873 (Utah 1947): 
"It is our opinion that a 
person who drives a car while 
[intoxicated] is reckless and 
evinces a marked disregard for 
the safety of others and is there-
fore guilty of criminal negligence," 
(at 874) . 
Many other jurisdictions have held similarly. In 
Michigan the Court said: 
"It is gross and culpable 
negligence for a drunken man to 
guide and operate an automobile 
upon a public highway. . . . It 
was criminal carelessness to do so. 
. . ." (People v. Townsend, 183 
N.W. 177 (Mich. 1921). 
This holding was later affirmed in People v. Layman, 
299 Mich. 141, 299 N.W. 840 (1941). The Iowa Supreme 
Court held similarly in State v. Kellison, 11 N.W. 2d 371 
(Iowa 1943). That case also gives authority form 
numerous other jurisdictions on the point. 
-9-
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As to driving on the wrong side of the 
road, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 
356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948) said that whether or not it is 
criminally negligent to drive on the wrong side of the 
road depends on the circumstances. In the Riddle case 
the court, however, found the defendant guilty of criminal 
negligence because he: 
,f
. . . permits his automobile to 
get onto the left side of the road, 
and fails to see an automobile 
approaching in a lawful manner from 
the opposite direction." (188 P.2d 
at 453). 
In other words, the Riddle court found the defendant 
guilty of criminal negligence for doing exactly the same 
thing as appellant did. That result was later affirmed 
in State v. Clark, 223 P.2d 184 (Utah 1950) where another 
defendant was held to have been criminally negligent 
in allowing his car to cross onto the left portion of the 
road as traffic approached. 
Respondent therefore submits that appellant was 
criminally negligent and that his conviction should be 
affirmed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
ACCEPTING THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT. 
Before appellant could be convicted of the 
crime of automobile homicide, it was necessary to show 
that he was driving at the time of the accident. At 
the scene of the collision a highway patrolman asked 
appellant if he was the driver of the Chevrolet truck. 
Appellant responded affirmatively (T.13). At trial, 
the officer testified to this admission, over 
appellant's objection, before any corroborating 
proof of the fact had been received. Appellant claims 
that this is reversible error. 
A trial court is endowed with broad discre-
tion in managing a trial and the order in which 
evidence is received. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of State v. Pollock, 102 Utah 587, 129 P.2d 554 
(1942), held that rules as to the order of introducing 
topics of evidence are directory and not mandatory. 
The Court went on to say that an alteration in the 
prescribed order is allowable in the discretion of 
the court. 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The above rule applies in the case where 
there is a confession or admission along with the 
necessary corroborating evidence* In Murphy v. 
State, 221 Tenn. 351, 426 S.W.2d 509 (1968), cert. 
denied 402 U.S. 945, the Court held: 
" . . . admitting the confession 
prior to the introduction of some 
evidence of the corpus delecti . . . 
admits to no more than harmless error 
where the corpus delecti is later 
established." 426 S.W.2d at 514. 
In State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 320 P.2d 467 
(1958), the Arizona Supreme Court held: 
"The [confessions] were 
admissible in the event proof of 
corpus delecti were ultimately 
submitted. Whether it should be 
allowed at the particular time is 
merely a matter of the order of 
proof and not of its admissibility." 
For similar holdings in other states see People v. 
Cantrell, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 (1973); 
State v. Smith, 12 Wash.App. 720, 531 P.2d 843 (1975); 
and Mcintosh v. State, 86 Nev. 133, 466 P.2d 656 
(1970). The rule is summed up in McCormick on 
Evidence, page 347: 
-12-
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"Because of the trial 
court's discretion over the order 
of proof [the usual rule that 
corpus delecti be established 
prior to admission of a confession] 
is for practical purposes not a 
condition of admissibility, but 
rather . . . a formulation of the 
required proof to take the case to 
the trier of fact or to sustain a 
finding of guilt." 
Therefore, the real issue is whether or not 
the State was able to corroborate the admission of the 
appellant. Respondent submits that there is more than 
adequate evidence to so do. A highway patrol officer 
testified that only one other person was riding in 
the vehicle with the appellant. This other person was 
sitting on the passenger side of the Chevrolet truck 
when the officer first observed him (T.16). This other 
person was bleeding quite heavily and there were pools 
of blood on the passenger side of the truck (T.17,44). 
As for the appellant, he only had one small cut by his 
eye (T.46). The officer further testified that the 
door on the passenger side was so damaged that it could 
not be opened (T.43). 
It is impossible to view this evidence in 
any way other than in a manner which proves beyond all 
-13-
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doubt that appellant was the driver of the truck. 
For appellant to have been the passenger would have 
required that he have removed the injured man from 
the driverfs seat, gotten out of the truck on the 
driver's side and then put the injured man back in 
the truck through the driverfs side and then have pushed 
him back over to the passenger sider and all this while he 
kept the injured man from bleeding until he got to the 
passenger side. This would have been a difficult task 
even if appellant had been sober. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that there was more than 
sufficient proof of the corpus delecti. Further, it 
does not matter in what order the proof comes in, 
particularly where the court is sitting without a 
jury. Finally, although the Automobile Homicide Statute 
requires no more than a showing of simple negligence, the 
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was 
criminally negligent. His conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
/ ' . , - • - . • ' • ' ' • , • • ' • • • • • ' . • . • 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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